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Abstract
In May 2020, a ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court (FCC) questioned the legality of the Bundesbank’s partic‐
ipation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public Sector Purchase Programme. Applying elements of a principal‐agent
analysis, this article analyses how the FCC ruling presents uswith a newunderstanding of the relationship between the ECB,
other EU institutions and Eurozone member states. Existing principal‐agent analyses of the ECB focus upon its relations
with other EU‐level institutions and point to the limited ex ante control mechanisms and efforts to reinforce ex post con‐
trol mechanisms—notably European Parliament oversight. The FCC ruling and the ECB’s reaction demonstrate the relative
importance of national level controls over the ECB agent. This article understands the role of private plaintiffs in Germany
as a form of ‘fire alarm’ on ECB policymaking against the background of weak ex post controls at the EU‐level.
Keywords
accountability; Bundesbank; Bundestag; Court of Justice of the European Union; European Central Bank; European
Parliament; German Federal Constitutional Court; monetary policy; ordo‐liberalism; principal‐agent analysis
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Reforming the Institutions of Eurozone Governance” edited by Anna‐Lena Högenauer
(University of Luxembourg), David Howarth (University of Luxembourg) and Moritz Rehm (University of Luxembourg).
© 2021 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu‐
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
On5May 2020, the German Federal Constitutional Court
(FCC) presented a ruling (Weiss and others, 2020) that
put into question the legality of the Bundesbank’s par‐
ticipation in the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) Public
Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). The ruling created
an intense backlash at the EU‐level for its potential eco‐
nomic, legal and political implications. In the midst of
an unprecedented crisis created by the Covid‐19 pan‐
demic, the FCC’s ruling threatened to undermine, if
not eliminate altogether, the most important macroe‐
conomic response to the crisis implemented by the
ECB at the EU‐level—the Pandemic Emergency Purchase
Programme (PEPP). The FCC’s ruling is the latest episode
of a long‐term jurisdictional struggle between the
German Constitutional Court and the EU Court of Justice
(CJEU) over the operation of the ECB in particular, and
EU integration more generally (Davies, 2012; see also
Table 1).
Indeed, a group of German private plaintiffs has
challenged before the FCC all the ECB’s asset purchase
programmes launched since 2010 (Arnold & Chazan,
2020a; De Cabanes & Fontan, 2019). Yet, judging the
legality of ECB monetary policy falls primarily within
the CJEU’s jurisdiction. Hence, the FCC has passed on
the cases to the CJEU through the preliminary ruling
procedure but reserved the right to review the latter’s
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 241–251 241
decisions. For example, when the European Court ruled
against the complaint introduced by Peter Gauweiler—
a former Bundestag member of the Bavarian Christian
Social Union party—against the Outright Monetary
Transactions (OMT) in 2016, the FCC judges recognized
the primacy of the CJEU jurisdiction but they also
expressed their dissatisfactionwith the content and form
of the CJEU ruling.
On 5May 2020, the FCC judges found that the CJEU’s
Weiss and Others (2018, 2020) ruling was ultra vires as
it failed to provide an adequate assessment of the pro‐
portionality of the ECB’s PSPP. The FCC required the ECB
to justify its programme to the German government and
parliament within three months. More specifically, the
FCC required the ECB to demonstrate that the economic
impact of its bond purchases was proportionate to the
objectives set out in the EU treaties—the Maastricht
Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU). Following the FCC
ruling, if the German federal government and Bundestag
(the lower house of the German federal parliament) had
reached the conclusion that the ECB was exceeding its
prerogatives, then the Bundesbank would have been
obliged to withdraw from the PSPP and all German gov‐
ernment bonds purchased by the Bundesbank under the
PSPP would have had to be sold (Fazzini & Urbani, 2020).
The FCC ruling does not disentangle the responsibility of
the two institutions: “The Federal Government and the
Bundestag are required to take steps seeking to ensure
that the European Central Bank conducts a proportional‐
ity assessment” (Weiss and Others, 2020).
The ECB initially announced that it was subject exclu‐
sively to the jurisdiction of the CJEU, which had found
the PSPP legal (Mersch, 2020). Several Governing Council
members even argued that the ECB should not respond
to the FCC ruling as it would create a legal precedent that
could undermine the efficiency of its policies (Arnold,
2020). The CJEU and the European Commission also
underlined that the FCC ruling was not in line with the
constitutional order in the EU (Von der Leyen, 2020).
However, during the two next months, the ECB deployed
considerable efforts to prepare a detailed answer to the
FCC’s ruling. This answer demonstrates that the ECB was
cautious to avoid a potential political and economic crisis
linked with the ruling from German judges.
Against this background, the aim of this article is to
analyse the politics of this new relationship between the
ECB and the FCC, and between the ECB and national
level fire alarms more generally. We thus seek to answer
the following research question: How should we best
understand the relationship between the operationally
independent ECB and the FCC? Legal analysis provides
important insights as to the impact of this issue on the
EU constitutional order but limited guidance to explain
the ECB’s response to the FCC (“Preliminary References
to the Court of Justice,” 2015; “The German Federal
Constitutional Court’s PSPP Judgment,” 2020; “The OMT
Decision,” 2014). From a political science perspective,
the relationship between two independent institutions
operating at the national and supranational level is a
good vantage point to analyse power struggles and legit‐
imacy concerns within Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). In particular, this conflict begs the question
of who controls the ECB’s monetary policy, knowing
that the ECB has been granted an unprecedented level
of independence from other institutions in its polity
(Howarth & Loedel, 2005; Quaglia, 2008).
Applying elements of a principal‐agent analysis, we
answer this research question by arguing that the FCC
ruling was a national level fire alarm—an ex post con‐
trol on ECB monetary policy—which the ECB was unable
to ignore politically. More precisely, we argue that the
inability of police patrols and fire alarms to force the ECB
to justify its nonconventional monetary policy at the EU
level was conducive to the emergence of ex post con‐
trols at the national level. In other words, the perceived
ineffectiveness of the control mechanisms over the ECB’s
monetary policy at the EU level increased efforts to hold
the ECB to account at the national level.
Existing principal‐agent analyses on these questions
focus upon the EU‐level and underline the consider‐
able autonomy assigned to the bank by its member
state principals, the limited ex ante control mechanisms
(Elgie, 2002) and efforts to reinforce ex post control
mechanisms—notably by improving the oversight of
the ECB’s monetary policy by the European Parliament
(Jabko, 2003). The FCC ruling presents us with a new
understanding of the application of a principal‐agent
analysis to the operation of the ECB agent and its rela‐
tionship with its member state principals for two rea‐
sons. First, the controlmechanismsweremanaged at the
national level. Second, the control mechanisms included
private plaintiffs. Conversely, studies of the relationship
between national governments and parliaments and the
ECB focus upon the ‘politicisation’ of monetary policy
usually for domestic political ends (Dyson & Marcussen,
2009; Tesche, 2019). This national‐level politicisation has
not yet been examined in terms of the focus of the
principal‐agent analysis upon ex post controls on ECB
monetary policy. However, the recent ruling of the FCC
demonstrates the need to extend the principal‐agent
analysis to the national level. We also analyse how ex
post mechanisms play out in the case of the ECB’s other
(non‐monetary) policies—notably, banking supervision
and the ECB’s participation in the Troika—in order to
highlight the specificities of these mechanisms when
they apply to monetary policy.
The next section in this article examines the rele‐
vance of principal‐agent analysis to the operations of
the ECB and its relations with other EU institutions and
national‐level bodies. The third section examines the
weak ex post control mechanisms at the EU and national
levels, prior to focusing on the significance of legal chal‐
lenges as fire alarms brought by private plaintiffs at the
national level. The conclusion considers the likelihood of
ongoing legal challenges at the national level.
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2. Who Can Control the Independent ECB?
2.1. The Principal‐Agent Framework and the ECB
This study employs elements of the principal‐agent
framework to analyze the surveillance relationships
between, on the one hand, EU institutions, member
states bodies and individuals and, on the other hand,
the ECB. In applying elements of the principal‐agent
analysis, we recognize the potential validity of the argu‐
ment that, with regard to the ECB’s monetary pol‐
icy, it is more appropriate to understand the ECB as
a ‘trustee’ of national governments rather than as an
‘agent’ because monetary policy was delegated to over‐
come problems arising from time inconsistency (see
Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017; Majone, 2001). In partic‐
ular, the principal‐agent framework cannot determine
whether the ECB’s policies are in line with the principal’s
preferences because the ECB’s objectives were left delib‐
erately vague in the treaty (Elgie, 2002). If this vagueness
is interpreted as a commitment to ensure a high level of
ECB autonomy, the risk of agency shirking or slippage is
highly unlikely because the central bankers define their
objectives themselves. By contrast, if this vagueness is
interpreted as a mechanism to allow the principals’ pref‐
erences to evolve, agency shirking or slippage can occur,
but the time inconsistency problem remains.
Nonetheless, even as a trustee of governments,
the issue of adequate scrutiny of ECB monetary policy
remains and the concepts of ex post police patrols and
fire alarms are analytically useful (Pollack, 1997). In a
principal‐agent approach, principals delegate authority,
administrative responsibility and tasks to agents because
of their organisational capacities and technical compe‐
tence. Tensions exist because agents often have their
own agendas, organisational imperatives, and turf issues
that may conflict with those of their principals. Efforts by
agents to seek autonomy from hierarchical control con‐
tribute to agency loss or slack in the forms of shirking and
slippage. Shirking arises from the agent’s preference to
not fully implement the principals’ preferences. Slippage
arises when the agent develops distinct preferences
from those of the principal as set in the terms of delega‐
tion. Slippage can be agent‐induced or structure‐induced.
The latter occurs when the agent’s use of its discretion
derives neither from its own interests nor those of the
principal but as a consequence of the environment in
which the principal implements its tasks (Chang, 2020;
Delreux & Adriaensen, 2017). Agency slack therefore
rests on a continuum (Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, & Tierney,
2006; Heldt, 2017). Agents benefit throughout these
relationships from the advantage of privileged informa‐
tion regarding their own preferences, capabilities, and
efforts at implementing delegated tasks. This asymmet‐
rical information limits principals from fully understand‐
ing and evaluating the activities of their agents (Kiewiet
& McCubbins, 1991; Miller, 2005).
Principals attempt to address this information asym‐
metry and control the risk of agency shirking and slip‐
page through ex post controls, known also as oversight
procedures. These ex post controls are conventionally
divided into ‘police patrols’ and ‘fire alarms’ (Kiewiet &
McCubbins, 1991). ‘Police patrols’ consist of an active
surveillance of a sample of the agent’s behaviour by
the principal with the aim of detecting any of their
non‐compliance with the principal’s policy preferences.
These include public hearings, studies, field observa‐
tions and examinations of regular agent reports (Pollack,
1997). ‘Fire alarms’ are the principal’s indirect ex post
controls because in its monitoring of the agents’ activ‐
ities, the principal relies on the support of third parties.
‘Fire alarms’ are less costly but at the same time, they are
also less centralised and tend to bemore superficial than
‘police patrols.’ Classic principal‐agent analysis expresses
a clear preference for ‘fire alarm’ monitoring over police
patrols (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984).
All of these dynamics are present in the EU andmore
specifically with regard to the operation of the ECB, an
agent that was granted considerable political and oper‐
ational independence from both member state govern‐
ment principals and other EU institutions (Howarth &
Loedel, 2005). Member state governments, operating
as a collective principal (Chang, 2020; Dehousse, 2008)
set the terms of delegation for the ECB agent in the
Maastricht Treaty. The ECB is characterized by a nar‐
row mandate, centred on the overarching objective of
price stability, and a very high level of independence:
It has the autonomy to define its policy objectives and
instruments. The onlymeaningful operational restriction
enshrined within the ECB mandate is the prohibition of
the monetary financing of government debt. This prohi‐
bition derived from the influence of the Bundesbank on
the ECB template (McNamara, 1998).
In the principal‐agent framework, the modification
of the mandate of the agent by the principals is the
strongest form of ex ante control. Indeed, if princi‐
pals notice agent slippage, they can modify the agent’s
objectives as well as its degree of autonomy. Yet, this
ex ante control is hardly applicable in the case of the ECB
because the modification of its mandate requires Treaty
change and, thus unanimous agreement among EUmem‐
ber states (Jabko, 2009). Member states can also exert
another form of ex ante control when they appoint the
ECB’s executive board. Yet, sincemember states have dis‐
tinct, and at times opposed, economic preferences, the
politics of ECB appointment follow an intergovernmen‐
tal logic where the nationality of the candidate matters
more than policy ideas (Fontan, 2016). Consequently, a
change in ECB personnel is more informed by the out‐
come of power struggles between member states than
by the logic of agency control. In sum, the diversity
of preferences within the collective principal strongly
undermines the ex ante controls over the ECB.
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2.2. Weak Police Patrols and Fire Alarms at the EU‐level
Three institutions form the police patrols in relation to
the ECB at the EU‐level. First, the European Parliament
monitors ECB activities. The legal basis allowing the
European Parliament’s surveillance of ECB activities is
very weak: The TFEU only requires the ECB to present
its Annual Report to the Parliament. The Parliament
expanded its monitoring function with the ECB’s active
cooperation from 1999 onwards with the use of a
number of mechanisms including reports, questions
addressed directly to the ECB in letter form, and ques‐
tions to the ECB Governing Council members who attend
meetings of the Parliament’s Economics and Finance
Committee. This voluntary cooperation benefits both
institutions: On the one hand, the ECB strengthens its
democratic responsiveness—or at least the appearance
of this responsiveness; on the other hand, the European
Parliament gains a position of privileged interlocutor
with the ECBdespite its historicalweakness onmacroeco‐
nomic issues (Jabko, 2001). Yet, the lack of coercive legal
tools weakens the oversight power of the Parliament.
In the rare direct confrontations between the ECB and
the Parliament, the latter’s position was systematically
dismissed by central bankers in the name of their inde‐
pendence. For example, the European Parliament (2014)
adopted a resolution criticizing the role of the ECB in the
EU Troika expert groups sent to countries benefiting from
EU loans. The ECB dismissed the Parliament’s criticism
and continued to participate in the Troika.
Second, the EU Court of Auditors performs audits on
some ECB activities. In 2018, the Court audited the ECB in
its role as banking supervisor, but only partially, since the
ECB would not make certain documents available during
the audit. The compromise found between the two insti‐
tutions was to sign a memorandum allowing the release
of bank‐specific data to the Court of Auditors while the
latter underlined that it was ‘not seeking to audit mone‐
tary policy’ (Court of Auditors, 2019).
Third, the CJEU has the power to investigate ECB
measures when third parties legally challenge it within
a period of two months (article 263 TFEU). From a
principal‐agent perspective, third parties are fire alarms.
At the EU‐level, they include the European Commission
and the European Parliament in that these institutions
are not part of themultiple principals and had, atmost, a
secondary role in determining the original ECB mandate.
Both institutions can launch legal proceedings against
the ECB. However, since the start of EMU in 1999, nei‐
ther the European Parliament nor the Commission have
ever legally challenged the choice or design of the ECB’s
monetary instruments. Neither have operated as a fire
alarm on ECB monetary policy. However, the European
Commission has brought cases against the ECB to the
CJEU on other matters including the delimitation of
competences between the Commission and the ECB
(Commission v. ECB, 2003).
Finally, the history of CJEU jurisprudence towards the
ECB shows a marked contrast between the legal cases
on monetary policy and other issues (De Cabanes &
Fontan, 2019). On the one hand, CJEU judges perform a
substantive analysis on cases that are not directly related
to monetary policy and sometimes rule against the ECB
opinion. On the other hand, when CJEU judges have
to evaluate the legality of monetary instruments, their
judicial review is procedural and they are careful not to
second‐guess the ECB opinion (Baroncelli, 2016).
2.3. Weak National Police Patrols
Turning to the national level, the Eurozone member
states rely on their national parliaments and courts to
monitor the ECB’s monetary policy. In addition to send‐
ing its annual reports to national parliaments, ECB mem‐
bers have appeared in front of national parliaments,
albeit only as a voluntary gesture of goodwill. An analy‐
sis of Mario Draghi’s visits to Eurozone national parlia‐
ments shows that these visits weremore akin to ceremo‐
nial strategies for the ECB to improve its accountability
rather than a true form of parliamentary control (Tesche,
2019). By contrast, national parliaments can forcefully
invite ECBmembers to appear before national parliamen‐
tary committees on banking supervision issues (Fromage
& Ibrido, 2018). However, Gandrud andHallerberg (2015)
argue that no EUmember state has achieved a significant
level of parliamentary scrutiny of banking supervision—
by either national bodies or the ECB—which owes in part
to the commercial sensitivity of the policy area.
In sum, while the process of collecting information
may produce disciplinary effects through the systematic
use of surveillance techniques, the compliance of agents
ultimately depends upon the application of meaning‐
ful sanctions. Yet, the structural features of macroeco‐
nomic governance in the Eurozone allowed the ECB to
benefit from an unprecedented degree of institutional
autonomy. The legal dispositions enshrined within the
European treaties provided no procedural mechanisms
to other EU institutions to exert meaningful control over
the ECB’s monetary policy. Moreover, the deep eco‐
nomic and ideological divisions among Eurozone govern‐
ments weakened the possibility of such controls. Hence,
police patrols at both the EU and national level on ECB
monetary policy and other activities have had limited
impact. Given the high level of ECB independence and
the timidity of police controls, the only form of potential
ex post sanction for agency slippage involved the CJEU.
However, over the first two decades of EMU, the ECB had
avoided CJEU legal sanction that required any significant
change in monetary policy. Against this background, pri‐
vate plaintiffs at the national level started to challenge
the CJEU by launching cases in the national legal sys‐
tem that, through the preliminary ruling procedure,were
pushed up to the EU‐level.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 2, Pages 241–251 244
3. The Extension of De Facto National Controls over
ECB Monetary Policy
3.1. Asset Purchase Programmes and Ordo‐Liberalism
The asset purchase programmes implemented by the
ECB potentially undermine two core elements of the
ECB’s mandate outlined in the Maastricht Treaty: the pri‐
mary focus on price stability and the prohibition of the
monetary financing of government debt. Given the rel‐
atively low inflation rate over most of the past decade,
the topic of price stability is less immediately relevant
for those concerned with ECB slippage—although there
have been several challenges to the ECB on this matter
and the ECB has insisted on the neutralization of its asset
purchases (see, for example, Högenauer & Howarth,
2016). Thus, agency loss, here slippage in terms of
asset purchase programmes, focuses on the extent to
which these programmes involve, de facto, the mone‐
tary financing of government debt. The ECB itself has
insisted that sovereign bond purchases are necessary to
ensure the adequate transmission of its monetary pol‐
icy throughout the Eurozone and not to fund govern‐
ments per se (ECB, 2015). In line with this argumenta‐
tion, the ECB Governing Council delimited the purchase
of sovereign debt fromdifferent national governments in
the Eurozone according to its capital key—that is, the per‐
centage of debt purchased from national governments
is determined by the percentage of capital that they
have contributed to the ECB. While, de facto, the ECB
is engaged in the purchase of sovereign debt, it must
demonstrate that these purchases are proportionate to
its policy objective—that is, that their benefits outweigh
their potential costs (Schnabel, 2020).
From a macroeconomic perspective, this evaluation
is rather straightforward. Because sovereign debt forms
the bedrock of modern financial markets, its stabiliza‐
tion is necessary to prevent the aggravation of financial
crises (Gabor & Ban, 2016). From this perspective, the
lines between monetary and fiscal policies are neces‐
sarily blurred. However, beliefs on monetary policy and
central banking arrangements vary. In Germany, these
beliefs are still heavily influenced by ordo‐liberalism, an
economic doctrine that advocates the strict separation
between fiscal andmonetary policies and a prioritisation
of price stability over other monetary policy objectives
as necessary components of a democratic legal order
(Young, 2014). Other creditor countries in the Eurozone,
such as the Netherlands and Finland, share these mon‐
etary preferences, although the salience of monetary
issues is lower than in Germany (Frieden &Walter, 2017;
Nedergaard, 2020).
In fact, since 2010, the strongest expressions of con‐
cern regarding ECB asset purchases came from German
politicians and officials at the national level (see also
Rehm, 2021). For example, Wolfgang Schäuble, the for‐
mer German Finance Minister, blamed ECB unconven‐
tional monetary policy for the rise of the far‐right
party, Alternative Für Deutschland (Wagstyl & Jones,
2016). A small number of national central bank lead‐
ers, notably the Bundesbank President and Governing
Council members have publicly opposed ECB asset pur‐
chases (Howarth, 2012). Members of a range of national
parliaments have also expressed concern and criticism—
notably in Germany and the Netherlands (“Dutch parlia‐
ment,” 2019). Högenauer (2019) shows how ECB mon‐
etary policy became politicized in the Bundestag since
the start of the sovereign debt crisis. While it is highly
unlikely that this criticism forced any real change to
ECB monetary policy—given ECB independence and the
diversity of views in Eurozone countries—it forced the
ECB to respond principally in terms of increasing out‐
reach and communication effort to explain its monetary
policy (Tesche, 2019). Draghi visited the Bundestag twice
during his term as president and a number of other
national parliaments once.
3.2. National Courts as Fire Alarms
The potentially most effective fire alarm to challenge
ECB monetary policy involves judicial and administra‐
tive reviews. Judicial review by the CJEU is allowed by
TFEU articles 263 and 277, while national courts can
also engage in judicial review but—through the prelim‐
inary ruling procedure (article 267 TFEU)—are expected
to push the cases up to the CJEU. There is also administra‐
tive review by the ECB’s Administrative Board of Review
and by national competent authorities on the ECB’s role
in banking supervision. However, with regard to mone‐
tary policy, this review has not been used.
To date, there have been numerous legal cases
brought by private plaintiffs against the ECB that national
courts have referred up to the CJEU. Most of these
cases have focused on the ECB’s role in banking supervi‐
sion (Berger, 2019). However, a number of these cases
focused on the ECB’s monetary policy, notably on the
Greek case (Accorinti and Others v. ECB, 2014). All the
legal cases brought against the ECB’s asset purchase pro‐
grammes were undertaken by German private plaintiffs,
who followed a logic of trial and error (for a full list
of cases brought against the ECB asset purchase pro‐
grammes adopted since 2008 see Table 1). The first
constitutional complaint brought by German plaintiffs
against ECB programmes was directly filed with the FCC,
which found them baseless (2BvR 987/10, 2BvR 1485/10,
2BvR 1099/10). The German plaintiffs filed their second
and third complaint directly with the CJEU (T‐532/11,
C‐102/12P, T‐492/12, C‐64/14P). The latter dismissed
their application and indicated to the plaintiffs that they
should first address their complaint to the national con‐
stitutional court, which would then refer the case to
the CJEU (T‐492/12, alinea 47). Following the CJEU’s indi‐
cation in its ruling, the German plaintiffs complained
directly to the FCC, which then referred to the CJEU for
all the subsequent cases.
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Table 1. Summary of the legal cases brought against ECB asset purchase programmes.
Case Plaintiff(s) Rulings Ruling summary
Securities Markets Hankel, Nölling, FCC Constitutional complaints dismissed
Programme/constitutional Schachtschneider, 2 BvR 987/10 because unfounded. The Securities Markets
complaint (2010) Spethmann, 2 BvR 1485/10 Programme respects Article 123.
Starbatty, Gauweiler 2 BvR 1099/10
Securities Markets Städter Tribunal of the EU Action dismissed as manifestly inadmissible
Programme/action for T‐532/11 as it was filed out of time.
annulment (2011)
Securities Markets CJEU Appeal dismissed as manifestly unfounded.
Programme/appeal (2012) C‐102/12 P
OMT/action for von Storch and Tribunal of the EU Action dismissed as inadmissible, as the
annulment (2012) 5,216 other plaintiffs T‐492/12 applicants were not directly concerned
(Zivile Koalition) by the contested acts.











FCC The FCC rules that the decision to create
complaint (2013) 2 BvR (2728/13— the OMT programme is in contradiction
2731/13) with TFEU (Art. 119, 123 and 127 TFEU
2 BvE 13/13 and Art. 17 to 24 ESCB Statute). Suspension
of proceedings, reference for a preliminary
ruling to the CJEU.
OMT/prejudicial CJEU Articles 119, 123 and 127 of the TFEU and
demand (2014) C‐62/14 Articles 17 to 24 of the Statute of the ESCB
should be interpreted as allowing the ESCB
to adopt the OMT programme.
OMT/2016 FCC The FCC follows the CJEU ruling but points
2 BvR (2728/13— out that the CJEU procedural analysis
2731/13) is problematic.
2 BvE 13/13
PSPP/constitutional Weiss, Lucke, FCC The FCC rules that the PSPP programme
complaint (2015 Starbatty, Gauweiler, 2 BvR 859/15 does not respect the TFEU (Art. 119, 123
and 2016) von Stein, Städter, 2 BvR 1651/15 and 127 TFEU and Art. 17 to 24 ESCB Statute).
Kerber and 1,700 2 BvR 2006/15 Suspension of proceedings, reference for a
more plaintiffs 2 BvR 980/16 preliminary ruling to the CJEU.
PSPP/Prejudicial CJEU The PSPP programme respects the TFEU.
question (2018) C‐493/17
PSPP (2020) FCC The FCC finds the CJEU ruling ultra vires and
2 BvR 859/15, asks to the German parliament to assess
2 BvR 980/16, whether the PSPP is proportional to the ECB
2 BvR 2006/15, objectives. If not, the parliament must order
2 BvR 1651/15 the Bundesbank to withdraw from the PSPP.
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on De Cabanes and Fontan (2019).
In all these cases, the German plaintiffs complained
about the legality of asset purchases in the name of
ordo‐liberal principles (De Cabanes & Fontan, 2019).
According to the plaintiffs, purchases of sovereign debt
belonged to the realm of economic policy rather than
monetary policy and disrespected the ‘no bail out’ clause
of the TFEU (Articles 119 and 127). These concerns
related directly to the strict separation between fis‐
cal and monetary policy in the ordo‐liberal doctrine
and fears of moral hazard and the fiscal profligacy of
Southern Eurozonemember states, which had been kept
alive by German political and economic policymaking
elites since the creation of the Eurozone (Howarth &
Rommerskirchen, 2013). These arguments were reiter‐
ated by Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank President, in
his 2013 hearing before the FCC (Ewing, 2013), which
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incorporated them into its prejudicial question to the
CJEU. After the CJEU dismissed these arguments in its
final ruling, the FCC expressed its concerns about the lack
of both CJEU independent expertise on monetary issues
and counter power to the ECB at the EU‐level (Gauweiler
and Others, 2016). The FCC had laid down the gauntlet
on the ECB asset purchase programmes.
The recent Weiss and Others case against the PSPP
can be seen as a reaction by a group of German plain‐
tiffs to the CJEU ruling on the Gauweiler case and their
failure to rein in ECB sovereign debt bond purchases
(Van Der Sluis, 2019). This was a national level fire
alarm in reaction to the perceived inadequacies of both
EU‐level police patrol/fire alarms with regard to the ECB
agent. The FCC set the standard of evidence of propor‐
tionality very high requiring potentially a full study of
the PSPP and proof that its benefits outweighed possi‐
ble negative effects across any other sector or part of
the economy. This is in strong contrast to the jurispru‐
dence of the FCC toward the Bundesbank: The former
never ruled a legal case in relation to the monetary pol‐
icy implemented by the latter (Van Der Sluis, 2019).
The ECB refused to send proof to the FCC that
the PSPP complied with the principle of proportional‐
ity. Instead, ECB Governing Council members reiterated
through press interviews that the ECB was accountable
to the European Parliament and subject to the jurisdic‐
tion of the CJEU alone (see, for example, Lagarde, 2020).
Despite the ECB’s defiant response, there is evidence that
the ECB sought to avoid future conflict with the FCC. The
ECB took unusual steps to demonstrate that its mone‐
tary policy decisions and the unconventional instruments
they used were compliant with the principle of propor‐
tionality pursuant to Article 4 TFEU (Nicolaides, 2020).
First, central bankers referred repeatedly to the
proportionality of their asset purchase programmes
during the Governing Council meeting of 3–4 June
2020, the first to follow the FCC ruling (Nicolaides,
2020). The summary of this meeting differs signifi‐
cantly from the previous twenty‐one summaries of
Governing Council meetings, notably in terms of the use
of the words ‘outweigh/outweighed’ and ‘proportional‐
ity/proportionate/proportional’ (Nicolaides, 2020):
Not only does the account refer to the positives out‐
weighing the negatives of PEPP but…it also hedges
the position of the ECB in relation to critical issues
in the judgment of the FCC, such as the weight that
could be attached to the various effects, possible
unintended effects of monetary policy, the effective‐
ness and efficiency of monetary instruments and the
impact of low interest rates. (Nicolaides, 2020)
Second, the ECB responded to the FCC ruling by passing
previously unpublished documents to the Bundesbank,
which then passed them to the German finance minister,
Olaf Scholz, who in turn passed them to the president
of the Bundestag (Arnold & Chazan, 2020b). While these
documents were not to be made available to the wider
public, theywere to be examinedby theGermanMinistry
of Finance and the Bundestag’s Budgetary Committee
operating in camera. On 2 July 2020, the Bundestag offi‐
cially announced that it supported the ECB, having found
that the central bank’s PSPP was proportional to its price
stability objectives (Arnold & Chazan, 2020c).
The ECB’s additional release of information and the
modification of the ECB’s public justification of its asset
purchase programmes are consistent with its overall
reputation‐building strategy, through which the cen‐
tral bank has tackled public contestation by increasing
its communication on controversial issues (Moschella,
Pinto, &Martocchia Diodati, 2020). The ad hoc and infor‐
mal collaboration of the ECB with the Bundesbank and
German political institutions without any formal change
to the ECB’s accountability either through unilateral ECB
official clarification or treaty change canbe seen as a ‘pro‐
cedural’ type of accountability (Dawson, Maricut‐Akbik,
& Bobić, 2019), which weakens the logic of checks and
balanceswithin the Eurozone. In terms of principal‐agent
analysis, this can be labelled as ‘buffering’ (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1991; Hawkins & Jacoby, 2006). Buffering
involves the provision of information and reporting by
the agent in its attempt to satisfy the principals with‐
out revealing too much information (Hawkins & Jacoby,
2006). The label can also be attached to the ECB’s largely
symbolic engagement efforts with national parliaments
(Tesche, 2019). Indeed, the ECB failed to prove that
the benefits from its asset purchase programmes out‐
weighed any negative effects in any other sector of the
economy because it lacked a model that could aggre‐
gate the effects of these programmes in diverse sectors
and add them up in any meaningful measure. The ECB
was only able to demonstrate that the positive effects
exceeded negative effects for a number of specific sec‐
tors, including banking. While ECB buffering can be seen
as central to the successful resolution of the difficulties
created by the FCC ruling, we lack the space in this con‐
tribution to examine in full the role of the ECB agent in
this context.
In sum, the substance of the arguments mobilized
by German public actors and private plaintiffs and, sub‐
sequently, by the FCC, shows that they have acted as a
national fire alarm in the fear that the ECB was moving
too far away from its original monetary policy mandate,
based on the Bundesbank (McNamara, 1998). The FCC
argument about the lack of counter‐power to the ECB at
the EU‐level also shows that the increased role played
by fire alarms at the national level was linked explicitly
with the lack of substantive pressure over ECB monetary
policy at the EU‐level. While the judicialisation of mon‐
etary policy by German private plaintiffs forced the ECB
to divulge additional documents and provide additional
explanations on its asset purchase programmes, it did
not trigger adverse moves from either the German polit‐
ical authorities or the Bundesbank, which had vocifer‐
ously criticised the PSPP since its inception (Braun, 2016;
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Howarth, 2012). Explaining this paradox—specifically the
failure of German political and elite economic policy‐
makers to sound the fire alarm in 2020—is likely linked
to the severity of the Covid‐19‐induced macroeconomic
crisis in the Eurozone. The aim to avoid a full‐blown
constitutional crisis in Germany, in which German polit‐
ical authorities would order the politically and oper‐
ationally independent Bundesbank to withdraw from
the Eurosystem of central banks is another potential
explanation. Finally, the lack of consistency in the dis‐
course of German elites on ECBmonetary policy could be
explained by scapegoating tactics, whereby elites score
political points at the national level by criticizing ECB
policies with ordo‐liberal arguments but refrain from
assuming the consequences of a German withdrawal
from the Eurozone. However, without further empirical
research, it would be imprudent to attempt to disentan‐
gle these causal explanations: a full explanation of the
German politics on the ECB’s PSPP must be the subject
of another article.
4. Conclusion
We return to the research question posed in the intro‐
duction to this article: How should we best understand
the relationship between the operationally independent
ECB and the FCC? We answer this question by arguing
that the FCC functions as a fire alarm and in effect a fil‐
ter for private plaintiffs with the potential to sanction sig‐
nificantly the ECB through rulings on Bundesbank action.
We argue that the efforts of German private plaintiffs
and the FCC ruling present us with a new understand‐
ing of the application of a principal‐agent analysis to
the operation of the ECB agent and its relationship to
its member state principals because the control mecha‐
nisms were managed at the national level. Private plain‐
tiffs challenged the ECB for operating in a manner they
believed was contrary to its mandate and, specifically,
challenged the participation of the Bundesbank in the
ECB’s PSPP by filing a complaint before the FCC. The FCC
pulled the fire alarm by ruling in favour of the private
plaintiffs and explicitly requiring the Bundesbank to end
its participation in the ECB’s PSPP if the latter failed to jus‐
tify the wider macroeconomic effects of its nonconven‐
tional monetary instrument. Both the private plaintiffs
and the FCC sought to uphold what they in effect argued
and ruled was the correct understanding of the ECB’s
mandate as agreed by member state heads of govern‐
ment and state in the Maastricht Treaty and inspired in
large part by the German central bank and government
(Dyson & Featherstone, 1999). The FCC also intentionally
and explicitly sought to highlight the weakness of both
EU‐level police patrols and fire alarms in relation to the
ECB agent and specifically the weakness of the CJEU as
a mechanism of control. The indignant response of both
the CJEU and the European Commission with regard to
the German Constitutional Court’s ruling focused princi‐
pally upon its proclaimed illegality and the assertion of
the supremacy of EU law and courts on matters concern‐
ing ECB monetary policy. However, the response of the
ECB—in passing information to the German government
and parliament seeking to demonstrate the macroeco‐
nomic proportionality of the PSPP—to avoid a potential
constitutional, political and economic crisis shows that
the FCC ruling could not be easily ignored.
Stepping aside from the empirical analysis that has
driven this article and turning to more normative consid‐
erations, we note that the legal and institutional vacuum
in which the ECB has operated its nonconventional mon‐
etary policy since 2010 can be seen as highly problematic
for the balance of powers between the ECB and the other
institutions of the EU political system. EU‐level ex post
controls have been perceived as inadequate. At the same
time, we recognise that it is also politically problematic
for the FCC to fill the gap by pushing control over the
ECB agent to control over the Bundesbank element of
that agent. In addition to the legal issues that the FCC’s
ruling raises, a number of tricky political questions arise.
For example, to what extent did the response of the ECB
agent reflect the relative economic and political impor‐
tance of Germany in the Eurozone? Would such a legal
challenge in a smaller, less economically and politically
important Eurozone country force the ECB to respond in
the same way? The unclear answers to these questions
raise legitimacy concerns. In the end, the German pri‐
vate plaintiffs did not get their way and the ECB’s PSPP
was not terminated. However, the ECB’s forced response
to the FCC ruling combined with the politically timid
acceptance of this response by the German government
and parliament, sets a clear precedent. The national
(German) legal fire alarm highlighted the problematic
democratic vacuum in which the ECB operates. A future
court case is only a matter of time.
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